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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
nature of the article sold is determined and the place of delivery indicated,
with only the time indefinite but fixed within a period certain, the courts
have generally held that the buyer's right to order within the interval is an
option which, if not exercised, leaves the duty on the seller to perform on
the last day of the period to avoid being in default and to hold the buyer
on the contract.2 Similarly, where the seller has the option to deliver, at
any time during a period upon giving notice, failure to give notice does
not relieve the buyer of the duty of accepting delivery on the last day.3
Where the place of delivery is not stipulated, contracts with this same
provision as to time of delivery are construed to require an order and
shipping directions as conditions precedent to the seller's duty to deliver,
and a failure to order is a breach of contract.4
The difference in result seems justifiable. Whereas in the absence of a
stipulation as to place, delivery is impossible without further instructions,
in contracts like that in the instant case the undertaking by the seller to
deliver within the period is unequivocal and dependent on no other factors.
It is well established that, absent special circumstances, a stipulated time
for performance is of the essence of a contract and the other party's duty
is conditioned on performance in or by that time.5 It seems reasonable that
the rule should apply in construing "on or before" and buyer's option con-
tracts. S. F. T.
WILLS-FoRGERY-ADMISS1BILITY OF TESTATOR'S DECLARATIONS MANIFEST-
ING FRKNDSHIP-[Arkansas].--Proponent offered the testimony of himself
and others to show the special regard of testatrix for himself as contrasted
with the heirs. He opposed the admission in evidence of declarations of
testatrix, outside the res gestae, which showed her friendly feeling toward
contestants and were offered in corroboration of additional substantial evi-
2. Bennett v. Igleheart Bros. (1927) 37 Ga. App. 200, 139 S. E. 431;
Phelps v. McGee (1856) 18 Ill. 155; North v. Kizer (1874) 72 Ill. 172; A. B.
Hemenover v. Buckles (1922) 225 Ill. App. 392; Willmering v. McGaughey(1870) 30 Ia. 205, 6 Am. Rep. 673; Chandler v. Robertson (1840) 39 Ky.
291; Sousely v. Burn's Adm'r (1873) 73 Ky. 87; British Aluminum Com-
pany, Ltd. v. Trefts (1914) 163 App. Div. 184, 148 N. Y. S. 144; Rogers-
Pyatt Shellac Co. v. Starr Piano Co. (1925) 212 App. Div. 792, 209 N. Y. S.
727; Cleveland & Co. v. Sterrett (1871) 70 Pa. 204; Conawingo Petroleum
Refining Co. v. Cunningham (1874) 75 Pa. 138. Contra: Posey v. Scales
(1876) 55 Ind. 282.
3. Horticultural Development Co. v. Loxley Farms Co. (1925) 214 Ala.
109, 106 So. 686; Duncan v. Allen (1926) 204 Ala. 551, 108 So. 357; Kirk-
patrick v. Alexander (1877) 60 Ind. 95; Rickey v. Shinkle (1887) 36 Kan.
516, 13 Pac. 795; Crown Embroidery Works v. Gordon (1920) 190 App.
Div. 472, 180 N. Y. S. 158; Livesley v. Strauss (1922) 104 Ore. 356, 206
Pac. 850; Brunswig Grain Co. v. Anchor Grain Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1926) 10 F
(2d) 304.
4. Big Muddy Coal & Iron Co. v. St. Louis-Carterville Coal Co. (1913)
176 Mo. App. 407, 158 S. W. 420; Colvin v. Weedman (1869) 50 Ill. 311;
Weill v. American Metal Co. (1899) 182 Ill. 128, 54 N. E. 1050; Percy Kent
Co. v. Silberstein (1926) 214 N. Y. 440, 150 N. E. 509.
5. Sabin Robbins Paper Co. v. Cal Hirsch & Sons Mercantile Co. (Mo.
App. 1924) 263 S. W. 479; Lokey v. Rudy-Patrick Seed Co. (Mo. App. 1926)
285 S. W. 1028; Williston, Sales (2d. ed. 1924) 1132, see. 453a.
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dence to prove a forgery of the will. Held, that such evidence was properly
admitted.1
Contrary to the practice in England,2 most American jurisdictions ex-
clude the declarations of a testator, apart from the res gestae, where the
forgery of the will is in issue.3 The courts taking this view stress the
receptivity of such unsworn declarations to fabrication and fraud.4 The
utterances are considered substantive facts extraneous to the will proper,
hence incompetent unless a part of the res gestae.5 The minority of states
seem to have allowed a limitation to this rule, admitting the declarations
when they do not constitute the sole evidence of forgery but are offered in
corroboration of direct evidence. 6 Texas7 and Ohio s have changed over to
the iiajority view. On the other hand the exception propounded in the
minority jurisdiction has meanwhile won more following and is gradually
supplanting the former view.9
1. Holloway v. Parker (Ark. 1938) 122 S. W. (2d) 563. See 1 Jarman,
Wills (7th ed. 1930) 417.
2. Doe d. Ellis v. Hardy (Assizes 1836) 1 Moo. & R. 525, 174 Eng.
Rep. 181.
3. Throckmorton v. Holt (1900) 180 U. S. 552; Leslie v. McMurtry(1895) 60 Ark. 301, 30 S. W. 33; Robinson v. Brewster (1892) 140 Ill. 649,
30 N. E. 683, 33 Am. St. Rep. 265; Walton v. Kendrick (1894) 122 Mo.
504, 27 S. W. 872; Miller v. Miller (1909) 96 Miss. 526, 51 So. 210; Far-
leigh v. Kelley (1903) 28 Mont. 421, 72 Pac. 756, 63 L. R. A. 319; Chaney
v. Coulter (1918) 29 Ohio C. A. 177, 45 Ohio C. C. 481; Swope v. Donnelly(1899) 190 Pa. 417, 42 Atl. 882; 70 Am. St. Rep. 673; Ricketts v. Ricketts
(1924) 151 Tenn. 525, 267 S. W. 597; Marls v. Adams (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) 166 S. W. 475.
4. Leslie v. McMurtry (1895) 60 Ark. 301, 30 S. W. 33; In re Gregory(1901) 133 Cal. 131, 65 Pac. 315; Robinson v. Brewster (1892) 140 Ill.
649, 30 N. E. 683, 33 Am. St. Rep. 265; Mooner v. Olsen (1879) 22 Kan.
69; Morvant's Succession (1893) 45 La. Ann. 207, 2 So. 349; Miller v.
Miller (1909) 96 Miss. 526, 51 So. 210; Walton v. Kendrick (1894) 122
Mo. 504, 27 S. W. 872; Farleigh v. Kelley (1903) 28 Mont. 421, 72 Pac.
756, 63 L. R. A. 319; Boylan v. Meeker (1860) 28 N. J. L. 274; Johnson v.
Hicks (N. Y. 1869) 1 Lans. 150; Chaney v. Coulter (1918) 29 Ohio C. A.
177, 45 Ohio C. C. 481; Swope v. Donnelly (1899) 190 Pa. 417, 42 Atl. 882,
70 Am. St. Rep. 637; Ricketts v. Ricketts (1924) 151 Tenn. 525, 267 S. W.
597; Kennedy v. Upshaw (1885) 64 Tex. 411; Mars v. Adams (Tex. Civ.
App. 1919) 160 S. W. 622.
5. Ibid.
6. Venable v. Venable (1910) 165 Ala. 621, 51 So. 833; Hannah v. Peake(Ky. 1819) 2 A. K. Marsh 133; Hoppe v. Byers (1883) 60 Md. 381, Corbett
v. State (1890) 3 Ohio C. D. 79, 5 Ohio C. C. 155; Johnson v. Brown (1879)
51 Tex. 65. The fact that such declarations can be manufactured is said
to go to their weight, not their admissibility. Rea v. Pursley (1930) 170
Ga. 788; 154 S. E. 325; Atherton v. Gaslin (1922) 194 Ky. 460, 239 S. W.
771; In re Creger's Estate (1929) 135 Okla. 77, 274 Pac. 30.
7. Kennedy v. Upshaw (1885) 64 Tex. 411; Mars v. Adams (Tex. Civ.
App. 1914) 166 S. W. 475.
8. Chaney v. Coulter (1918) 29 Ohio C. A. 177, 45 Ohio C. C. 481.
9. Gilliland v. Dobbs (Ala. 1937) 154 So. 784; In re Thompson's Estate(1927) 200 Cal. 410, 253 Pac. 697; Rea v. Pursley (1930) 170 Ga. 788,
154 S. E. 325; Baird v. Shaffer (1917) 101 Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836; In re
Bailey (1920) 180 N. C. 30, 103 S. E. 896; State v. Ready (1909) 78
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
It may be that the instant decision extends no further than to the situa-
tion where evidence objected to is produced in response to a dispute raised
by proponents, thus making out a case of invited error. This solution
appears to have been the basis of decision elsewhere.10 It is submitted,
however, that the Arkansas court accepts the above-held limitation to the
majority rule recognized more generally by other recent decisions.11 The
contest is thus given complete perspective with a continuing safeguard
against fraud afforded by the power of rejecting declarations when offered
as the sole proof.12
In Missouri an early tenuous holding13 excluded declarations of a testa-
tor where forgery was in issue on the basis of earlier dicta 14 set forth in
discussing admissibility to show mental capacity. No subsequent case has
arisen on this specific subject. It would seem, however, that the question
as to the admissibility of testator's declarations where forgery of the will
is in issue cannot be resolved by analogies drawn from cases involving
fraud, undue influence, or mental capacity.' 5 In such cases distinctions may
be drawn between declarations prior to the date of execution and declara-
tions subsequent thereto; but the date of execution is itself in issue where
the will is contested on the ground of forgery. Since the minority view
applies only to cases involving a claim of forgery, a strong argument may
be advanced against the soundness of interpreting the Missouri decision as
an adoption of the majority rule. To construe the decision as admitting
of the minority limitation would place Missouri in accord with recent deci-
sions refusing to crystallize the special situation as to forgeries into a rule
admitting no exception.
W.N.
N. J. L. 601, 75 At]. 564, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240; People v. Storr (1912)
207 N. Y. 147, 100 N. E. 730, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 860; In re Creger's
Estate (1929) 135 Okla. 77, 274 Pac. 30; Maxwell v. Ford (1927) 103
W. Va. 124, 136 S. E. 777. The acceptance of this limitation does not, of
course, involve complete rejection of the general rule.
10. Venable v. Venable (1910) 165 Ala. 621, 51 So. 833; Gilliland v.
Dobbs (Ala. 1937) 154 So. 784; In re Bailey (1920) 180 N. C. 30, 103
S. E. 896.
11. In re Thompson's Estate (1927) 200 Cal. 410, 253 Pac. 697; Rea v.
Pursley (1930) 170 Ga. 788, 154 S. E. 325; Baird v. Shaffer (1917) 101
Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836; Atherton v. Gaslin (1922) 194 Ky. 460, 239 S. W.
771 (the leading case); In re Creger's Estate (1929) 135 Okla. 77, 274
Pac. 30; Maxwell v. Ford (1927) 103 W. Va. 124, 136 S. E. 777.
12. Venable v. Venable (1910) 165 Ala. 621, 51 So. 833; In re Thompson's
Estate (1927) 200 Cal. 410, 253 Pac. 697; Rea v. Pursley (1930) 170 Ga.
788, 154 S. E. 325; Baird v. Shaffer (1917) 101 Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836;
Hannah v. Peake (Ky. 1819) 2 A. K. Marsh 133; Hoppe v. Byers (1883)
60 Md. 381; State v. Ready (1909) 178 N. J. L. 601, 75 AtI. 564, 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 240; In re Creger's Estate (1929) 135 Okla. 77, 274 Pac. 30; Max-
well v. Ford (1927) 103 W. Va. 124, 136 S. E. 777.
13. Walton v. Kendrick (1894) 122 Mo. 504, 27 S. W. 872.
14. Gibson v. Gibson (1857) 24 Mo. 227, 228, 234.
15. In re Creger's Estate (1929) 135 Okla. 77, 274 Pac. 30.
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